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SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT OF OPEN FIELDS: A
COMMENT ON OLIVER AND THORNTON
BARBARA ROCKHILL EDWARDS

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the past term the United States Supreme Court announced
its decision in Oliver v. United States' and declared that open
fields 2 are not embraced by the fourth amendment's prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures of a citizen's "effects."
In so doing the Court reaffirmed its earlier conclusion, first expressed in 1924 in Hester v. United States,3 that fourth amendment protection does not extend to open fields.
The return full cycle to Hester is not without its irony. In the
sixty years separating these two landmark decisions both federal
and state courts had receded from Hester and granted fourth
amendment protection to open fields; the courts had placed reliance upon the Supreme Court's increasingly liberal interpretations
of the reach of the fourth amendment. The Oliver decision represents a rejection of that liberal interpretative philosophy and a return to a literal, more conservative view of a narrowly defined prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The purpose of this comment is to explore the birth of the open
fields doctrine and to analyze the interpretative philosophies which
caused the initial expansion and subsequent regression of the doctrine. The open fields doctrine will be followed from its birth in
Hester, through adolescence, the vital middle years, and into the
senility assigned to the doctrine by today's Court.

II.

THE BIRTH AND NURTURE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

Britain's use of writs of assistance and general warrants during
the colonial period was perceived by the colonists as an infringement of the rights of citizens and thus as an abuse of governmental
power.4 To ensure that analogous actions by their own government
1. 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
2. Essentially, open fields are exactly what one would expect them to be-outdoor areas.
The controversy underlying the decisions discussed in this comment is whether the fourth
amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to persons and
effects situated in these outdoor areas.
3. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
4. Writs of assistance were documents used in the colonies by British officers to authorize the examination of ships, vaults, cellars, and warehouses where contraband was suspected to be located. General warrants were used in Great Britain to allow the search of
private homes for papers and books. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463
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would be foreclosed, the fourth amendment was written and
adopted by the founding fathers.5 The first draft of the amendment, which was presented by James Madison at the first congressional session, read:
The right of the people to be secured in their persons, their
houses, their papers, and their other property from all unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated by warrants issued
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or not
particularly describing the places to be searched, or the persons
or things to be seized.'
The committee which was to determine the language of the congressional proposal to the states changed the wording of the original text. Mr. Gerry, a committee member, presumed that there was
an error in the wording and moved to substitute the words "and
effects" for "other property. '7 What emerged from the committee
is the fourth amendment in its present form:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.'
Unfortunately, we have no method for determining what was in
the minds of the committee members at the time that the amendment was drafted. Whatever distinction they perceived between
the words "other property" and "effects" will probably remain a
mystery.9 This mystery becomes problematical when courts attempt to construe the amendment's content and implications in
current legal disputes.
In 1886, Justice Bradley followed the "spirit" of the Constitution
rather than the "letter" when he delivered the opinion of the Court
(1928); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-30 (1886); Note, From Private Places to
Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV.
968, 969 n.6 (1968).
5. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 449; Boyd, 116 U.S. at 624-30; Note, supra note 4, at 96970.
6. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 450.
7. Id.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 450.
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in Boyd v. United States.1" Although the facts of the case 1 were
contrary to the usually understood meaning of the terms "search
and seizure," the Court nevertheless applied those terms, stating:
Though the proceeding in question is divested of many of the aggravating incidents of actual search and seizure, yet, .

.

. it con-

tains their substance and essence, and effects their substantial
purpose. It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest
and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional
practices get their first footing in that way, namely

. . .

by silent

approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure.
This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should
be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives
them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciationof
the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is
the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights
of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. 2
Bradley was echoing the sentiments of Chief Justice Marshall
when he cautioned that a constitution, by its nature, cannot be a
legal code. If a constitution attempted to be exacting, it would become unintelligible. 3 By 1925, however, the Court was ignoring the
urgings of Marshall and Bradley and promoting more literal constitutional interpretations in Carroll v. United States.1 4 Holding
10.

116 U.S. 616 (1886). Justice Bradley stated:
The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of constitutional
liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of the case then
before the court. . . . It is not the breaking of [the defendant's] doors, and the
rummaging of his drawers . . . but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty and private property [which is objectionable].
Id. at 630.
11. In Boyd the concern was the constitutionality of courts compelling the production of
private papers for use as evidence in noncriminal cases. The courts were authorized to order
defendants to produce papers which the government alleged would prove elements of the
offenses charged. Failure to comply resulted in admission of the facts which the government
alleged that the papers would substantiate. Id. at 619-20.
12. Id. at 635 (emphasis added).
13. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). "Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and
the minor ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves." Id. at 407.
14. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Federal prohibition agents, in an earlier encounter, arranged to
buy liquor from the defendants. Although the arranged sale was never consummated, the
agents became familiar with the car which the defendants drove. In subsequent routine
highway patrols, this auto was seen traveling between Grand Rapids and Detroit and was
ultimately stopped and searched. Sixty-eight bottles of liquor were found secreted behind
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that both the search and the seizure were justified under the facts
of the case, the Court implied that the fourth amendment was to
be construed narrowly, stating that "[t]he Fourth Amendment is to
be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable
search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which
will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of
individual citizens."' 5
This battle of interpretative philosophy would have been of only
academic interest were it not for the decisions in Weeks v. United
States"" and its progeny, which gave teeth to the fourth amendment. The exclusionary rule announced in Weeks required that all
materials seized under federal authority in violation of the fourth
amendment were to be returned to the owner upon his motion and
could not thereafter be used as evidence in federal court.' 7 Suddenly, the determination of what did or did not constitute an unreasonable search and seizure became of paramount importance in
winning federal convictions.
For a time, however, federal authorities attempted to circumvent
the upholstering of the seats. Id. at 135.
15. Id. at 149. The kind of construction advocated by the Carroll Court and others to
follow crystalizes the problems created by the courts' inability to understand the exact implications of the use of the word "effects" in the fourth amendment. Because there were no
automobiles at the time the amendment was written, it certainly cannot be claimed that the
Framers intended the specific inclusion of cars within the scope of the term; however, it is
equally impossible to determine if articles analogous to automobiles were intended to be
included in the word "effects," due to the lack of any record of discussion as to the meaning
of the term.
16. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The defendant was arrested at work while police officers gained
entry to his home, searched it without a warrant, and seized certain papers and articles.
Later the local police returned with a United States marshall, conducted an additional
search, and seized additional materials. Id. at 386.
17. Id. at 398. The Court did not disallow the use of the material seized by the police in
the instant case because it was not done under federal authority. Id.
[T]he Fourth Amendment . . . put the courts of the United States and Federal
officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under limitations and restraints [and] . . .forever secure[d] the people, their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law ...
and the duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under
our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws.
Id. at 391-92. In explaining the importance of the rule, the Court stated:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence
against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment
declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value,
and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the
Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those
great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.
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the spirit of Weeks. In Silverthorne Lumber v. United States,",
the Court held that when subpoenaes were based on earlier unconstitutional searches and seizures, evidentiary use of the subpoenaed materials in criminal proceedings against the party required
to produce them was prohibited. The Court stated that
"knowledge gained by the government's own wrong cannot be used
by it in the way proposed."1 9 Shortly thereafter, the Court held
that a motion for the return of illegally seized evidence was not
necessary. Its admission into evidence was error even when return
of the material was not requested.20
Although Weeks had done much to restrain the unlawful activities of federal officers, local and state police had no equivalent incentive to similiarly restrict their behavior. In 1949 the Court had
an opportunity to extend the exclusionary rule to nonfederal prosecutions in Wolf v. Colorado.2 1 It was an opportunity missed, because the Court failed to make the extension. This failure seems
puzzling upon examination of the rationale which the Court employed. The Court was quick to state that the "security of one's
privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the
core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society."" The
Court further opined that such behavior by the police, based solely
upon their own authority, was to be condemned as inconsistent
18. 251 U.S. 385 (1920). Two corporate officers were arrested at home and detained for
several hours while federal authorities searched their business offices and seized numerous
documents. The originals were returned to the defendants pursuant to Weeks, but the government retained photographs and copies of all seized materials. Thereafter a grand jury
served subpoenaes on the defendants ordering them to produce the originals.
The Court held that the government was not entitled to do in two steps that which it was
prohibited from doing in one and reversed contempt convictions entered against defendants
for failure to comply with the subpoenaes. The importance of this decision is that the Court
expanded Weeks to embrace more than the actual tangible evidence illegally obtained; in so
holding, the Silverthorne Court rejected the government's position that the fourth amendment protected physical possession without precluding any advantages which the government could otherwise gain through committing an act otherwise prohibited by the guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 390-92.
19. Id. at 392. Justice Holmes stated that to prevent the fourth amendment from being
reduced to a "form of words" illegally seized evidence "shall not be used at all." Id.
20. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921). The defendant's pretrial motion for
the return of illegally seized documents was denied. On appeal he contended that the trial
court erred in not inquiring into the origin of the papers at the time at which they were
proffered against him. The Supreme Court held that the trial court was under a duty to
entertain an objection to admission or a motion for exclusion, and in the process to determine whether the evidence had been unconstitutionally seized, notwithstanding a pretrial
denial of a motion to return the evidence. Id. at 312-13.
21. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
22. Id. at 27.
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with individual rights and violative of the Constitution. Accordingly, any state which actively approved such behavior by state au23
thorities would be in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
Then, paradoxically, the Court refused to apply the exclusionary
rule to help assure the right which it had explicitly recognized. The
Court's justification that there were other methods to insure compliance with the amendment left much to be desired.24
More to the point, however, was the Court's recognition of the
fact that many states had considered implementing the Weeks rule
on their own initiative, but few had done so.2" Apparently, the
Court was unwilling to force a rule upon the states, regardless of
the validity of that rule, where the states had previously declined
to adopt it themselves.
Ever diligent, federal authorities continued to circumvent the
Weeks rule through offering into evidence in federal criminal prosecutions material seized in violation of the fourth amendment by
nonfederal authorities. The federal courts' use of unconstitutionally seized evidence which had been gathered by state authorities,
a practice commonly referred to as the "silver platter doctrine,"
was put to an end by the 1960 Supreme Court decision of Elkins v.
United States.26

In explaining Weeks, the Court in Elkins noted that, while evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment was prohib23.

The Wolf Court stated that freedom from arbitrary police intrusion is
implicit in "the concept of ordered liberty" and as such enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause. The knock at the door, whether by day or
by night, as a prelude to a search, without authority of law but solely on the authority of the police, [does] not need the commentary of recent history to be condemned as inconsistent with the conception of human rights enshrined in the history and the basic constitutional documents of English-speaking peoples.
Accordingly, we have no hesitation in saying that were a State affirmatively to
sanction such police incursion into privacy it would run counter to the guaranty of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 27-28.
24. In the subsequent decision of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650-56 (1961), the Court
acknowledged the absurdity of the result which it had reached in Wolf.
For a discussion of the inadequacy of alternative methods of enforcing compliance with
the fourth amendment, see Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism,and the
Civil Liberties, 45 Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1950).
25. Forty-seven of the 49 states had considered the Weeks doctrine. Of those, 31 had
rejected it and only 16 had chosen to follow it. Allen, supra note 24, at 29.
26. 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (state officers seized evidence during an unlawful search and
seizure; the evidence was subsequently used against defendant in a federal prosecution).
The Court stated that the purpose of this new ruling was "to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it." Id. at 217.
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ited from use in federal criminal prosecutions, Weeks had announced a companion rule which allowed evidence seized
unlawfully by local police to be used in federal prosecutions. 27 Finally, in 1961 the Court held in Mapp v. Ohio28 that a violation of

the fourth amendment would invoke the exclusionary rule
as well as federal courts, for state as well as federal
thereby effectively overruling Wolf. Thus the exclusionary
moved the benefit derived from disregarding the fourth
29
ment, making it more than a mere "form of words.

in state
actions,
rule reamend-

In Mapp the Court was evidently unwilling to overrule itself
without thoughtful consideration and well-reasoned justification.
The Court first noted that the fourth and fifth amendments guaranteed personal privacy and that the courts were commissioned to
watch over these constitutionally guaranteed rights.3 0 Additionally,
the Court noted a change in the attitude among the states toward
the exclusionary rule since 1949 when Wolf was decided. "[I]n 1949
. . . almost two-thirds of the States were opposed to the use of the
exclusionary rule, now, despite [Wolf], more than half of those
since passing upon it, by their own legislative or judicial decision
have wholly or partly adopted or adhered to the [exclusionary]
rule."31 Further, the Court observed that other rights guaranteed
by the Constitution were not afforded a double standard in application, but that they were enforced equally in both state and federal courtrooms.3 2 The Court commented on the paradox that
27. Id. at 210. The Court noted that the problem "arose from the entirely commendable
practice of state and federal agents [cooperating] with each other in the investigation and
detection of criminal activity." Id. at 211.
28. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Searching for a suspect and "policy paraphernalia" in an unrelated case and acting on an informant's tip, police went to the Mapp home and demanded
admittance. Mapp, on advice of counsel, refused to admit them without a warrant. Three
hours later, after continuous surveillance, the police forcibly gained entrance. A struggle
ensued, Mapp was handcuffed, and police officers commenced a search of the entire premises. Id. at 644-45.
29. See supra note 19.
30. The Court stated that "constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. . . . It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon." Mapp, 367
U.S. at 647.
31. Id. at 651. Recognizing the inconsistency of Wolf in not imposing the exclusionary
rule upon the states, the Court quoted that decision: " '[W]e have no hesitation in saying
that were a State affirmatively to sanction such police incursion into privacy it would run
counter to the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment.' "Id. at 650 (quoting Wolf, 338 U.S.
at 28). The Court further noted that Wolf granted the right to protection against unlawful
searches and seizures but in reality withheld its privilege and enjoyment. Mapp, 367 U.S. at
656.
32. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656. The Court listed the rights of free speech, free press, and
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"[p]resently, a federal prosecutor may make no use of evidence illegally seized, but a State's attorney across the street may ....
""
The Mapp Court took note of the criticism of the exclusionary
rule that " 'the criminal is to go free because the constable has
blundered.' "" Nevertheless, the Court was swayed by countervailing considerations of judicial integrity and held that the exclusionary rule should apply in state criminal proceedings: "The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free.
Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to
observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its
3' 5
own existence.

III.

OPEN FIELDS: OUTSIDE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT WOMB

A.

The Birth of the Doctrine

The United States Supreme Court has long recognized various
exceptions to the ancillary warrant requirement of the fourth
amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures.36 There was one situation, however, in which the Court
held there was no fourth amendment protection at all-open
37
fields.
In Hester, revenue agents had entered the land of the defendant's father, secreted themselves, and watched while the defendant transferred a jug from the house to a car. An alarm was given,
and the defendant attempted to flee, dropping the jug in the process. The jug was seized and found to contain whiskey. The Court
found that the acts of the defendant had disclosed the evidence,
that once something is abandoned it cannot be "seized" in a legal
sense, and that the warrantless trespass into open fields was immaterial, because open fields are different from a house."
The Court's terse opinion merely stated that "it is enough to say
"the rights to notice and to a fair, public trial, including ... the right not to be convicted
by use of a coerced confession," as examples. Id.
33. Id. at 657. The Court also noted that "[in nonexclusionary States, federal officers,
being human, were ...

invited to and did ...

step across the street to the State's attorney

with their unconstitutionally seized evidence." Id. at 658.
34. Id. at 659 (quoting Justice (then Judge) Cardozo in People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585,
587 (N.Y. 1926)).
35. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659.
36. See generally Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 257 (1984).
37. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
38. Id. at 58.
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that, . . . the special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects,' is
not extended to the open fields. The distinction between the latter
and the house is as old as the common law." 39 The brevity of the
decision allows for little analysis.
B.

The Trespass Requirement

The distinction between houses and open fields reached a level
of critical importance in 1928 when the Court announced its decision in Olmstead v. United States." Olmstead was convicted of
violating the National Prohibition Act based upon evidence gathered by tapping his phones. The Court noted that the tapping was
accomplished by the insertion of small wires along ordinary telephone lines in the basement of an office building, without a trespass upon Olmstead's property. Certiorari was granted to consider
the evidentiary use of private telephone conversations intercepted
by a wiretap."' Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Taft stated
that a more liberal construction, even when used in an attempt to
effectuate the purpose of the Framers in the interest of liberty,
"cannot justify enlargement of the language employed beyond the
possible practical meaning of houses, persons, papers, and effects,
or so to apply the words search and seizure as to forbid hearing or
sight. '42 The Court held that the clandestine tapping of a telephone to record private conversations was not a violation of the
fourth amendment, absent a trespass upon the defendant's property. 43 In fact, the Court stated that a physical invasion was a prerequisite for ever finding a violation of the fourth amendment, although it alone was not determinative of a violation.4 4 In so
39. Id. at 59.
40. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
41. Id. at 455-57. The Court quoted Carroll in advocating a narrow, literal construction
of the Constitution. " 'The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was
deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted and in a manner which will
conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens.'" Id. at
465 (quoting Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149).
42. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465.
43. Id. at 464-66.
44. Id. Justice Taft, writing for the Court, cited numerous Supreme Court decisions in
his opinion to support the holding that the tapping of telephone wires was not a violation of
the fourth amendment because there had been neither a trespass nor a seizure. Id. at 46065.
Hester, the Court noted, also involved a trespass, but there was no constitutional infringement because "there was no search of person, house, papers, or effects." Id. at 465. Weeks
and Silverthorne, on the other hand, were used to evince the proposition that only the
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holding, the Court dismissed the spirit of Boyd by concentrating
on the narrow issue of compelled production. Noting that conversation is not a material thing which can be particularly described
or seized, the Court implied that it could not possibly be subject to
the fourth amendment, which requires such particular
description. 5
The majority saw danger in excluding otherwise admissible evidence gathered by unethical conduct on the part of the government, and decided that questionable behavior by the government
was more desirable than allowing criminals to escape justice."6
Justice Holmes, dissenting, noted that "[c]ourts are apt to err by
sticking too closely to the words of a law where those words import
a policy that goes beyond them. '4' 7 He believed "it . . . less evil
that some criminals should escape than that the Government...
play an ignoble part. 4 8 Justice Brandeis, in dissent, noted that although the tapping of a telephone was an evil which could not
have taken place in earlier times, the nature of a constitution was
one of immortality, and it contained general principles which
needed to be applied to new situations.4 9 The fact that these two
liberal interpretists were now in the minority indicated that a new
era was firmly entrenched.
In Hester the Court had said that a trespass was immaterial in
open fields, 50 and in Olmstead the Court held that there could be
no violation of the fourth amendment without a trespass.5 1 In addition, the Olmstead majority stated that an invasion of the curtiseizure of tangibles such as documents and books would constitute an unlawful seizure. Id.
at 460-61.
45. Id. at 462-64.
46. Id. at 468.
47. Id. at 469 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes foreshadowed the Court's holding
in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and the more liberally disposed Court of the
1960's.
48. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes' comment was an
echo of the views previously expressed by Justice Cardozo. Justice Holmes, however, was
unwilling to totally commit to either the majority or dissenting opinion. He stated that
"[w]hile I do not deny it, I am not prepared to say that the penumbra of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments covers the defendant .... " Id. at 469.
49. Id. at 472-73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis stated that the scientific
progress which made this unforeseen invasion possible was unlikely to be halted. He envisioned various kinds of intrusions, such as psychic invasions, which would defeat the spirit
of the fourth amendent but still circumvent the ruling of the Court. Id. at 474. He found the
tangible/intangible distinction between a letter and phone call to be meaningless. Id. at 475.
50. Hester, 265 U.S. at 58-59.
51. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
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lage is equivalent to an invasion of the house.52 Thus, while talking
of literal interpretation in one instance, the Court expanded the
constitutional protection in another. The fourth amendment, as interpreted after these decisions, would turn on a notion of "place,"
for a trespass requires an invasion of some space. The question remained as to what places would be construed as being protected by
the amendment.
The next fourth amendment landmark was to be Katz v. United
States,53 but there were nearly forty years of legal decisions in the
interim which deserve inspection. The decisions which followed
Olmstead and predated Katz demonstrate how the courts, confined by precedent to a literal interpretation of the fourth amendment, determined which places were to be afforded fourth amendment protection from trespass and which were not.
IV.

OPEN FIELDS UNDER LITERAL FOURTH AMENDMENT
CONSTRUCTION

A disproportionate number of the cases between Olmstead and
Katz involved the illegal production of intoxicants and the efforts
of the Treasury Department to curb this activity. 4 The fact patterns usually included agents entering private land and finding a
still housed in a farm building of some sort. The question for the
courts then became whether the agents had violated the fourth
amendment with their intrusion onto the property, or, if they had
entered the building where the still was operating, whether they
52. Id. "[T]he Fourth Amendment [has not] been violated ... unless there has been an
official search and seizure of ... tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion of
• . . house 'or curtilage' for the purpose of making a seizure." Id. It is probably the reference
in Hester to the common law which led to the inclusion of "curtilage" within the fourth
amendment's protection.
It is difficult to see how the facts of Hester could have occurred without a trespass upon
the curtilage. Yet the Court insisted that the curtilage is included within the fourth amendment language of "persons, houses, papers and effects" and that a trespass within the house
would have been a violation.
53. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
54. But see United States v. Mullin, 329 F.2d 295 (4th Cir. 1964) (possession rather than
production of untaxed whisky); United States v. Minker, 312 F.2d 632 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 953 (1963); United States v. Sorce, 325 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1963) (possession of
stolen goods). These cases predate the burgeoning drug culture which took hold in the early
1970's. The most current open fields cases relate primarily to drugs. See Rosencranz v.
United States, 356 F.2d 310 (1st Cir. 1966); United States v. Romano, 330 F.2d 566 (2d Cir.
1964); United States v. Hassell, 336 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1964); Monnette v. United States, 299
F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1962); Brock v. United States, 256 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1958); Hodges v.
United States, 243 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1957); Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22 (10th Cir.
1956).
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had made a prohibited entry. Only a few of the circuit courts of
appeals indicated explicit acceptance of the expansion of the word
"houses" to include the concept of "curtilage." 5 5 Interestingly, although the courts which explicitly embraced the concept differed
somewhat in their definition of curtilage,56 the criteria which they
applied for determining which buildings were included or excluded
from the concept were strikingly similar.
Generally, the court would look to the physical distance between
the dwelling and the outer building, 7 whether or not the outer
building was located within any enclosure which surrounded the
dwelling, 8 the building's use as an adjunct to domestic activity,5 9
55. Rosencranz, 356 F.2d at 313 (" 'houses' of persons, which word has been enlarged by
the courts to include the 'curtilage' or ground and buildings immediately surrounding a
dwelling, formerly usually enclosed"); Minker, 312 F.2d at 634 (trash can of apartment
building not within the protected curtilage); Hodges, 243 F.2d at 283 (no invasion of home's
immediate appurtenances forming curtilage); Care, 231 F.2d at 25 (fourth amendment applies to buildings within the curtilage); cf. Hassell, 336 F.2d at 686 (still located 250 yards
from defendants house; court considered the possibility that the barn which housed the still
was within the curtilage but justified the search on other grounds). But see Romano, 330
F.2d at 569 ("protection accorded by the fourth amendment to the people in their 'persons,
houses, papers, and effects,' does not extend to open fields, or to unoccupied buildings");
Sorce, 325 F.2d at 86 ("protection... does not extend to 'open fields,' . . . nor to 'enclosed
or unenclosed grounds around houses'" (citations omitted)); Monnette, 299 F.2d at 850 (going inside a fence, onto the front porch, and around to the back of the house to peer into a
window found permissible because a "trespass upon the grounds surrounding a building
does not constitute an illegal search"). The Monnette court did suggest that peering into the
window at the back of the house might have been a violation of the defendant's right to
privacy but for the fact that the house was not his dwelling place and that there no evidence
was gathered from the activity.
Romano, Sorce, and Monnette, dealing with an industrial complex, an open air nursery,
and a nonresidence, respectively, and their rejection of the curtilage concept, indicate that
the courts were not disposed towards applying the concept to such places.
56. See Rosencranz, 356 F.2d at 313 (curtilage consists of "ground and buildings immediately surrounding a dwelling, formerly usually enclosed"); Mullin, 329 F.2d at 298;
Hodges, 243 F.2d at 283 ("included are the buildings comprising the immediate domestic
establishment and which are thus the buildings 'constituting an integral part of that group
of structures making up the farm home' ") (quoting Walker v. United States, 225 F.2d 447,
449 (5th Cir. 1955)).
57. See Mullin, 329 F.2d at 298 (smokehouse approximately 75 feet from residence);
Minker, 312 F.2d at 634 (proximity to the dwelling); Brock, 256 F.2d at 57 (located some
distance from residence); Hodges, 243 F.2d at 283 (too removed in distance from
home-150-180 feet); Care, 231 F.2d at 25 (more than a long city block from the home).
58. See Minker, 312 F.2d at 634 (within enclosure surrounding home); Brock, 256 F.2d
at 57 (separated from residence by fence and gate); Care, 231 F.2d at 25 (within general
enclosure surrounding residence).
59. See Rosencranz, 356 F.2d at 313 (driveway suggests propinquity); Minker, 312 F.2d
at 634 (use as adjunct to domestic economy); Hodges, 243 F.2d at 283 (buildings comprising
domestic establishment making up farm home); Care, 231 F.2d at 25 (adjunct to domestic
economy).
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and whether there existed any barrier between the dwelling and
the outer building.6 Several courts also made a distinction between a "house" and a "dwelling" and declined to extend protection to houses which were not used as dwelling places."'
In determining whether a trespass was determinative of a fourth
amendment violation, the courts generally looked at the facts of
the cases to determine if the areas entered were included in their
understanding of the curtilage concept. If they were, a trespass
without a valid warrant was a violation of the security promised by
the Framers.2 If the areas entered were adjudged to be outside the
protected area, the trespass was deemed irrelevant as to the consti3
tutionality of the search or seizure.1
The application of this process and the criteria involved were
quite uniform throughout these cases. Only a comparison of
United States v. Mullin6 4 and Rosencranz v. United States 5
reveals a contradiction in the application of the factors determining curtilage. In Rosencranz the First Circuit found the existence
of a driveway between the house and outer building indicative of a
domestic connection between the buildings,6 6 while in Mullin the
Fourth Circuit suggested that a driveway between the buildings
would be a barrier.6 7 All in all, however, the open fields decisions
60. See Rosencranz, 356 F.2d at 313 (absence of barriers); Mullin, 329 F.2d at 298 (intervening barrier); Brock, 256 F.2d at 57 (separated by fence and gate); Hodges, 243 F.2d at
283 (set apart by fixed fences); cf. Care, 231 F.2d at 25 (in a field across the road from
house).
61. E.g., Monnette, 299 F.2d at 850 (if the house were a dwelling, protection would vest);
Brock, 256 F.2d at 57 (nearest residence not used as a dwelling).
62. See Rosencranz, 356 F.2d at 313:
The Treasury agent who led the search said, "it was a small farm with dwelling
house and barn to the left as you faced the premises." He also testified that tracks
of vehicles and footprints were visible on the snow, leading to both house and
barn; he decided to enter the barn first because the signs of traffic were somewhat
heavier. Other witnesses said there was a driveway between the barn and the
dwelling house. This suggests propinquity and absence of separating barriers.
See also Mullin, 329 F.2d at 298:
The residence was located in a rural community and was partially surrounded in
semicircular fashion by a number of outbuildings, a pattern traditionally found in
the area. Perry rented the premises and was living in the residence, along with his
family, at the time of his arrest. The smokehouse, from outside appearances, was
typical of any normal farm smokehouse.
63. See Mullin, 329 F.2d at 298 (smokehouse within curtilage, hence unwarranted entry
prohibited and evidence seized must be suppressed); Monnette, 299 F.2d at 850 (fourth
amendment does not extend to the grounds).
64. 329 F.2d 295 (4th Cir. 1964).
65. 356 F.2d 310 (1st Cir. 1966).
66. Id. at 313.
67. "[T]here was no intervening barrier of a fence or a driveway between the two build-
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exhibited a cogent consistency prior to Katz.
In United States v. Minker,6s the court stated that the important factors in fourth amendment cases are "the nature of the individual's interest in and the extent of the claimed privacy of the
premises searched." 9 These considerations foreshadowed the coming change in the Supreme Court's interpretative philosophy which
was crystallized in Katz.

V. A

RETURN TO THE DAYS OF LIBERALLY INTERPRETING THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT

In 1967 the Court was presented with a situation clearly unanticipated by the Framers of the Constitution when the Court decided
Katz v. United States.70 In Katz, officers had attached a recording
device to the outside of a phone booth and recorded the defendant's conversation. Until the Katz decision it was assumed that
an individual had automatic fourth amendment protection within
his home and its curtilage, but that a physical invasion of those
places was a prerequisite for invoking the fourth amendment's protection. Justice Stewart, delivering the opinion of the Court, stated
that a trespass was once believed a prerequisite to any fourth
amendment inquiry because the courts believed that the amendment forbade only searches and seizures of tangible property; he
noted, however, that this idea had been discredited. 1 In Katz, the
defendant was not within his home or its curtilage, and there was
no physical invasion of the phone booth. Nevertheless, the Court
was unwilling to find that the government's acts constituted a reasonable search and seizure, as the Olmstead court had. Instead, the
Court found that the acts of a person would evidence the type of
privacy which he expected, and that this particular expectation
72
was to be respected.
ings." Mullin, 329 F.2d at 298.
68. 312 F.2d 632 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 953 (1963).
69. Id. at 634 (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960)).
70. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, noted that a narrow
construction of the Constitution ignores the role of the public telephone in private communication. Id. at 352.
Justice Harlan commented on the vital role of the telephone in today's society. He stated
that the Court's prior limitations on fourth amendment protection "is, in the present day,
bad physics as well as bad law, for reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by
electronic as well as physical invasion." Id. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 352-53 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)).
72. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-53.
[O]nce it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people-and not sim-
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The majority rejected the use of such phrases as "constitutionally protected area" and "right to privacy" as an accurate description of that which the fourth amendment was designed to protect.7" Justice Stewart submitted that framing the issue in terms of
a constitutionally protected area diverted attention from the real
problem:
For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.

.

. [b]ut

what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
74
the public, may be constitutionally protected.

The fact that Katz's activity in the phone booth was visible because the door was constructed of transparent glass was irrelevant,
the Court said, because the issue was not what the officers saw
through glass walls, but what they heard with an electronic listening device. The Court stated that even a person in a telephone
booth is entitled to rely upon the protection of the fourth amendment. By shutting the door, one should be "entitled to assume that
the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to
'7 5
the world.
Further, the Court totally negated the requirement of a physical
invasion, stating that people, not simply "areas," were protected,
and that a determination of a violation of fourth amendment
76
rights would turn neither on an intrusion nor on a trespass.
The Court concluded by addressing the lack of a warrant, stating
ply "areas"-against unreasonable searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the
reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical
intrusion into any given enclosure. . . . [Tihe "trespass" doctrine . . . can no
longer be regarded as controlling.
Id. at 353.
The Court noted that what one "seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
the public, may be constitutionally protected." Id. at 351. The Court added, "[b]ut what
[Katz] sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not the intruding eye-it was the
uninvited ear." Id. at 352.
73. Id. at 351-52. The Court saw the amendment as protecting "individual privacy
against certain kinds of governmental intrusion," but, the Court noted, "its protections go
further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all." Id. at 350 (footnote omitted).
74. Id. at 351-52.
75. Id. at 352.
76. The reach of the amendment, the majority stated, "cannot turn upon the presence or
absence of a physical intrusion ...." Id. at 353. The majority further opined that the
trespass doctrine was no longer controlling. "The fact that the electronic device employed to
achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance." Id.
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that although the officers showed restraint in their behavior, they
needed prior judicial approval for their conduct. The safeguard of
judicial review was compulsory; the Court noted that the officers
probably had sufficient probable cause to justify judicial issuance
of a warrant, but that nonetheless their failure to do so was fatal."
Mr. Justice Harlan concurred. It is necessary to look closely at
Harlan's assessment of the case, because it soon became the standard by which fourth amendment questions were resolved.78 In replacing the notion of a "constitutionally protected area" with the
concept of a constitutionally protected "expectation of privacy,"
Justice Harlan stated that what was protected was not a place but
rather that which a person subjectively expected to remain private.
Places traditionally considered private, Harlan argued, were not
necessarily private. 9 Justice Harlan believed that the test to apply
in determining whether a fourth amendment violation had occurred consisted of two requirements: first, a determination must
be made as to whether the person had "exhibited an actual subjective expectation of privacy," and second, the court must decide if
that expectation was one which society would accept as reasonable
under the circumstances. Justice Harlan wrote that anything a
party subjected to the "plain view" of the public was not private,
because there could be no reasonable expectation of privacy under
those circumstances.80
Harlan submitted that prior cases had established the test which
he advocated. Using Hester as an example, Harlan explained:
[A] man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects
privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to
the "plain view" of outsiders are not "protected" because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. On the other
hand, conversations in the open would not be protected against
being overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable."1
77. Id. at 354-59.
78. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan's concurring opinion is often cited
by the courts as setting out the test for fourth amendment violations. See generally United
States v. Berrong, 712 F.2d 1370, 1373 (11th Cir. 1983); Comment, How Open Are Open
Fields? United States v. Oliver, 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 133, 143 (1982).
79. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
80. Justice Harlan interpreted the majority opinion as indicating a need for a person to
have exhibited an actual subjective expectation of privacy. He concluded under the facts of
the instant case that if Katz had not closed the phone booth door he could not have expected fourth amendment protection of his conversation. Id.
81. Id. (citing Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924)).
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This should have proved to have been an easily administered
two pronged test. The virtue of the test was the fact that it allowed
for changes in societal standards-an adaptability which should
have afforded it a long and useful life. Harlan is to be commended
for taking the principles advocated by the majority and formulating a standard which the courts could easily apply to fourth
amendment considerations. The majority had ruled that a trespass
would no longer control fourth amendment inquiries, and that
what one sought to preserve as private, if unexposed to the public,
might be afforded fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. A more thoughtful summary than
Harlan's is hard to envision.
This decision announced the beginning of another swing of the
interpretative pendulum. For over forty years, the courts had been
confined to a literal interpretation of the Constitution. But once
again an age of philosophical jurisprudence which had been urged
by earlier jurists-liberal interpretational philosophy-had returned. 2 Additionally, this decision signaled the coming of age of
the fourth amendment, for the announced standards exhibited a
heretofore unknown maturity.
The Court had accomplished a general expansion of the fourth
amendment, and it appeared that even open fields could be
brought under the amendment's protection if the circumstances
were right. If a man stood in the middle of an empty cow pasture
beside the freeway, he could not claim any protection from visual
intrusion, but in a secluded field, surrounded by thick, tall growth,
he might have a reasonable expectation of privacy from visual observation. Add sturdy fencing and "No Trespassing" signs around
the perimeter of the property, and it would seem that he also had
an expectation which society would not only accept as reasonable,
but would almost never reject. It seems obvious, then, that even in
an open field, if one manifested the requisite expectation under the
proper conditions, he could count on the fourth amendment's protection. Many courts agreed with this analysis; however, this was
not the understanding of all the courts. A brief study of some decisions that are representative of the open fields decisions which followed Katz evidences this inconsistency among the courts.
82.

Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
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OPEN FIELDS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AFTER

Katz

After the Katz decision many courts assumed that the open
fields doctrine had been modified to fall within the purview of
fourth amendment protection. These courts tried to determine
what was necessary to evidence a reasonable expectation of privacy
in outdoor areas which society would accept as reasonable. Some
courts found that certain kinds of fencing or the posting of "No
Trespassing" signs met the test requirements. The following examples are a representative overview of this approach.
In Norman v. State8" the Florida Supreme Court noted that taking "overt steps" to secure one's property against the public is evidence of a reasonable expectation of privacy. 4 Norman had been
convicted of possession of cannabis with the intent to sell. The
sheriff, acting on an informant's tip, and without benefit of warrant, went to the farm leased by Norman and, knowing it to be
unoccupied, climbed a locked fence and walked to a barn on the
premises. Peering through the windows, he confirmed that the
building contained marijuana. Several days later Norman was
stopped by a deputy and informed that the sheriff had seen the
marijuana. The deputy asked to be taken to the marijuana barn.
Norman complied and was later arrested; subsequently, officers returned to the farm and confiscated the marijuana." The Florida
Supreme Court held that climbing a fence to enter an unoccupied
farm was a violation of the fourth amendment, because Norman,
by placing the marijuana in a building and by fencing and locking
his property, had evidenced a reasonable expectation of privacy.8
83.
84.

379 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1980).
The court stated that
the capacity to claim the protection of the fourth amendment depends upon
whether a person has a "legitimate" expectation of privacy in the invaded area.
That expectation will be recognized as legitimate if a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and the expectation is one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable ....
It seems incontestable that Mr. Norman
exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy in the tobacco barn and its contents.
He took overt steps to designate his farm and barn as a place not open to the
public. The contraband, covered and wrapped in tobacco sheets, was in a closed
structure.
Id. at 647 (citation omitted).
85. Id. at 645.
86. Id. at 647. Accord United States v. Resnick, 455 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1972) (three
warrantless intrusions were made onto defendant's land which was in a sparsely populated
area, fenced with a six-foot chain link fence topped with one foot of barbed wire, and all
gates were locked; at one place the property was bounded by a lake; the officers gained
access by crawling through barbed wire and wading through a marshy area; court held the
last two intrusions invalid, without determining the status of the first entry), cert. denied,
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In Katz, both the majority and Justice Harlan made reference to
excluding that which was exposed to public view from fourth
amendment protection, as being either evidence of a lack of intended privacy, or evidence of an unreasonable expectation of privacy. Further clarification of just what the Court had in mind regarding what would exhibit an actual expectation of privacy was
given by the Court's 1974 decision in Air Pollution Variance
Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp.87 In that case, the Court implied

that excluding the public from one's land would evidence such a
subjective expectation. In contrast, the Court noted that plumes of
smoke which a government health inspector had seen while taking
a visual pollution test were visible to "anyone in the city who was
near the plant" and thus were outside the protection of the fourth
amendment.

88

The Second Circuit followed the lead of Katz and Air Pollution
in United States v. Lace, 89 observing that those things which any
member of the public can see are outside the warrant requirement
as applied to visual observation by the police. Lace and his coconspirators were convicted of trafficking in narcotics. They appealed
their conviction on the grounds that their fourth amendment
rights had been violated. Although the officers who investigated
the case had a warrant when they seized the evidence used at trial,
they had augmented the information provided by informants by
entering the seventy-acre farm and observing the backyard area
409 U.S. 875 (1973); State v. Kender, 588 P.2d 447 (Hawaii 1979) (lush growth of California
grass provided a natural barrier within which defendant could have a reasonable expectation
of privacy). But see United States v. Berrong, 712 F.2d 1370, 1373 n.5 (11th Cir. 1983)
(court held that warrantless entry upon defendant's land and seizure of marijuana plants,
after flying over to confirm a tip, was not a fourth amendment violation: "It is arguable
whether appellant Berrong exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy. The record indicates the total absence of any fence, wall, 'no trespassing' signs, or other artificial obstructions to entry on the property."); Ford v. State, 569 S.W.2d 105 (Ark. 1978) (fenced and
posted rural property under cultivation and without buildings is an open field), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 947 (1979); Luman v. State, 629 P.2d 1275 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981) (going through
barbed wire fence and two gates to collect plant sample was not a violation of the fourth
amendment for it was an open field outside the curtilage); Ochs v. State, 543 S.W.2d 355
(Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (dense growth around property does not necessarily make it something other than an open field), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
87. 416 U.S. 861 (1974) (health inspector, with neither warrant nor permission, entered a
business's outdoor premises and made visual pollution tests of emitted smoke).
88. Id. at 865.
89. 669 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 854 (1982). In Lace the court held that a
rented home and the surrounding grounds which were visible from a public road and from
which the public was not excluded were open fields for fourth amendment considerations.
Id. at 49.

656

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:637

using binoculars and a spotting scope before securing the warrant. 90 The question, as the court saw it, was whether the warrant
was issued upon sufficient legally obtained evidence. The court
held that if some of the evidence was obtained illegally, that would
not taint the warrant if, absent the illegally obtained evidence,
there were still sufficient grounds for its issue.9
The court said that because the area was visible from the road,
the defendants' lease arrangement contained an understanding
that the owners of the property could enter and use it for recreation, and the land was not posted and was used by hunters, the
observations made by the police did not require a warrant.2 The
defendants had not excluded the public, so the police had observed
only that which was exposed to public view and thus the defendants did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. The court
did not have to determine whether the independent information
was sufficient to justify the warrant.
In State v. Manly,93 the Washington Supreme Court stated that
even using a ladder and binoculars to look into a building through
an uncurtained window was not an invasion of fourth amendment
rights. Occupants of a second floor apartment were growing marijuana near a window. A university police officer reported that he
had seen what he believed to be a marijuana plant through the
window. As a result of that report, a detective in the drug control
unit drove by the apartment twice, observing nothing. Subsequently, he made an additional observation from across the street,
at which time he saw what he believed to be marijuana. To confirm
this observation, he used binoculars to enhance his view. Confident
that the plants were indeed marijuana, he crossed the street to
stand on the sidewalk beneath the window and look once again
with the binoculars, and reconfirmed his previous observations. 4
90. Id. at 47-50.
91. " 'The ultimate inquiry on a motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrant is not whether the underlying affidavit contained allegations based on illegally obtained
evidence, but whether, putting aside all tainted allegations, the independent and lawful information stated in the affidavit suffices to show probable cause.'" Id. at 49 (quoting United
States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 555 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting)).
92. Lace, 669 F.2d at 47-50; see also United States v. Freeman, 426 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir.
1970) (marijuana plants visible from common walkway in apartment building, even if within
the curtilage, cannot be reasonably expected to remain private); State v. Daugherty, 591
P.2d 801 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (a driveway is not a constitutionally protected area; it is
semi-private inasmuch as anything seen from such a vantage point does not constitute a
search), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 958 (1981).
93. 530 P.2d 306 (Wash.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855 (1975).
94. Id. at 307-08.
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In securing a warrant based on these observations, the detective
failed to mention his use of binoculars. The trial court, in holding
that the use of binoculars invaded the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy and in approving the Katz decision, found
that "without the use of binoculars [the officer] lacked sufficient
reason to justify issuance of the search warrant," and that the defendants "did not knowingly expose the marijuana plants to public
view and had a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding
them."95
The Washington Supreme Court, however, found the lack of curtains significant; it was evidence that the defendant had not manifested an intent to keep private that which could be seen through
the open window. The court concluded that the plants were visible
without binoculars, that there was no physical trespass, and that
"[tihe use of binoculars under these circumstances did not constitute an illegal search of the premises.""6
This line of decisions demonstrates that at least some courts accepted the premise that Katz set the standard for all fourth
amendment decisions. The exceptions to the warrant requirement
remained only for the physical protection of the authorities or in
those instances where either escape or destruction of evidence was
imminent. The open fields doctrine, for these courts, was subject to
the same requirements as any other search and/or seizure. If there
were a demonstration of an expectation of privacy which society
was willing to accept as reasonable, a search warrant would be necessary to avoid the exclusionary rule.
There were, however, other courts which questioned how, if at
all, the Katz decision modified Hester. In State v. White

7

the

court observed that all courts could not agree as to what effect, if
any, Katz had on Hester.9s The opinion is devoid of facts, presenting only the defendant's contention that Katz would dictate that
95. Id.
96. Id. at 309; cf. United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1980) (use of binoculars
from adjacent hilltop not illegal), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981); People v. St. Amour, 163
Cal. Rptr. 187 (Ct. App. 1980) (use of binoculars in aerial search not unreasonable). But see
State v. Barnes, 390 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (marijuana in backyard, identifiable
only through telescope, not within "plain view" exception); State v. Kender, 588 P.2d 447
(Hawaii 1979) (climbing fence and using telescope impermissible).
97. 332 N.W.2d 910 (Minn. 1983).
98. The White court noted that "[clommentators and courts have disagreed over
whether the [open fields] doctrine lost some of its vitality as a result of the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Katz ...." Id. at 911.
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he had a reasonable expectation of privacy on his land.9 9 Unsure

whether to apply Katz or Hester, the court looked to both cases in
deciding that the defendant's land was an open field and as such
his rights had not been violated.100
The rationale applied by the federal court in Fixel v. Wainwright10 was that the yard of a four-apartment complex was pri-

vate enough to warrant a reasonable expectation of privacy. 0 2
While officers were in possession of a warrant to search Fixel's
apartment, one of them concealed himself at the back of the building and, while thus hidden, observed Fixel leave the four-unit
building several times, go to a pile of rubbish each time, and remove a shaving kit from the rubbish. The other officer remained in
the front of the building observing activity there. After observing
for some time, one officer executed the warrant, while the other
retrieved the shaving kit. Although no narcotics were discovered in
the apartment, the kit was found to contain heroin. 0 3
The Fifth Circuit based its decision on the curtilage concept,
stating that the entry into the yard was an unlawful encroachment
on a protected area, even while they noted that Katz had discarded this distinction as a determinant of fourth amendment
rights. The court believed that one had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his curtilage. 04
In United States v. Cobler 0 5 the district court stated that a

trespass by a law enforcement officer is not by itself a prima facie
violation of the fourth amendment but suggested that trespass into
one's home or curtilage would be relevant as evidence of a violation
of one's reasonable expectation of privacy. 1°6 Acting on the suspi99. Id.
100. In applying both Katz and Hester, the White court held that "[niot only was the
land in question an 'open field' within the cases that rely on Hester, but defendant had not
taken sufficient steps to demonstrate that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
land under the cases that rely on Katz." Id.
101. 492 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1974).
102. The court concluded that the public exposure of the backyard of the complex,
which was surrounded by a fence, was too limited for the yard to be designated an open
field. Id. at 484.
103. Id. at 481.
104. Id. at 483. In referring to the idea of curtilage as possibly being a protected area,
the Fixel court said that "[tihe area immediately surrounding and closely related to the
dwelling is also entitled to the Fourth Amendment's protection. In defining the surrounding
area . . . the courts historically have found helpful the common law concept of curtilage
..... " Id. Yet, when holding that the backyard was not an open field, the court once again
used the Katz notion of a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 484.
105. 533 F. Supp. 407 (W.D. Va. 1982).
106. Id. at 411.
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cion that the defendant was involved in the distribution of moonshine, agents placed the defendant under surveillance. When defendant's truck entered a dead end road, the agents set up a
barricade. Approximately one-half mile from the point of entry the
road became a private country farm road leading to an abandoned
house and a farm leased by the defendant's father. Agents stopped
a car leaving the farm and discovered a gallon of moonshine. An
agent later discovered defendant's truck parked on a dirt farm
path which surrounded the edge of an open field. The truck was
unlocked, but a camper shell on the back was not. The shell had
curtained windows. The agent, smelling the strong odor of moonshine and noticing a crack between the curtains, used his flashlight
and saw some stacked jugs which he concluded contained moonshine. The
agent forced entry into the camper shell and seized the
10 7
whiskey.

In deciding that the defendant's fourth amendment rights had
not been breached, the court first noted that although the defendant had an expectation of privacy in the camper, it was neither
legitimate, reasonable, nor justified. The court used the plain view
exception to the warrant requirement to justify the seizure, stating
that the position of the agent upon the farm land did not include
an unjustifiable intrusion, because protection did not extend to
open fields. The court implied that had the search occurred within
the curtilage, rather than an open field, it might have been unlawful, despite the fact that expectations of privacy in an automobile
are diminished.'0 8
But in United States v. Freie,0 9 the Ninth Circuit noted that

common law property concepts were not determinative of an expectation of privacy; however, the court applied the common law
curtilage concept when noting that the area searched was not adjacent to someone's home." 0
107. Id. at 408-09.
108. Id. at 410-12.
109. 545 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977).
110. The court said that a small rural airstrip and an adjacent private field which was
surrounded by a cattle fence was an open field, and thus defendants could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in closed cardboard boxes placed on the field. Id. at 1223.
Supporting the Katz decision, the court noted:
[T]he determination of whether an intrusion is an unreasonable search has depended on one's actual subjective expectation of privacy and whether that expectation is objectively reasonable. . . . Thus, the proper focus is no longer on common law property concepts. . . . It now appears that Hester no longer has any
independent meaning but merely indicates that open fields are not areas in which
one traditionally might reasonably expect privacy.
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United States Forest Service rangers had observed a small airplane land at a rural airstrip. Several hours later, when the plane
was apparently abandoned, the rangers approached it and observed boxes inside. The rangers called customs officials, but by
the time the officials arrived the plane had left and the boxes were
stacked in the field. A customs officer opened a box, discovered
marijuana, and notified DEA agents who began surveillance. After
a gun battle, one defendant was arrested and subsequently others
were also placed in custody."' The court found that the defendants lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the open field,
11 2
and that use of the drugs as evidence was permissible.
Although these cases exhibit some confusion over the application
of Katz property concepts, each court gave credence to the language of Katz by determining the existence or nonexistence of a
reasonable expectation of privacy in resolving the fourth amendment questions presented to them. These courts had apparently
not read Katz closely enough to ascertain that areas such as the
curtilage were no longer automatically considered private. The
courts' reasoning in these cases is unmistakably similar and certainly predicated upon the Katz holding. The major problem revealed by these cases, however, is the lack of consistency in the
application of the criteria and in the results. There was no consensus among the courts as to what did or did not demonstrate an
acceptable and reasonable expectation of privacy.
Conspicuous by their absence in the preceding discussion are
State v. Thornton" 3 and United States v. Oliver."" A more strik-

ing example of the divergence of result is not to be found. The
United States Supreme Court has recently passed judgment on
these cases, and those decisions will define, at least for a time, the
viability of Hester after Katz.
VII.

THE STATUS OF

Thornton AND Oliver

BEFORE THEIR TRIP

TO WASHINGTON

In Oliver, Kentucky State Police, acting on an anonymous tip
and rumor that marijuana was being grown, commenced an investigation. They entered Oliver's land via a posted road." 5 Upon enId. (citations omitted).
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 1219-21.
Id. at 1223.
453 A.2d 489 (Me. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
686 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1982) (en banc), af'd, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
Oliver, 686 F.2d at 358.

1984]

OPEN FIELDS

countering a locked gate blocking the road a short distance beyond
Oliver's house, they parked and proceeded on foot along a path
which led to the barn. Near the barn, the officers had a brief encounter with an unidentified person who told them that they could
not hunt there. 116 Beyond the barn, the officers discovered two
marijuana fields. The fields were located about one mile from Oliver's home on land which he leased to others and were not visible
from adjacent property." 7
The trial court allowed suppression of the marijuana, believing
that the gates and posting of the area created a reasonable expectation of privacy." 8 The Sixth Circuit had affirmed the suppression
but, upon sitting en banc, reversed, reasoning that: (1) Katz dealt
with a circumstance unpredicted at the time the fourth amendment was framed, whereas open fields were not unknown to either
the Framers or to the Court when it announced Hester;, 9 (2) the
unobservability of a field from adjacent property did not preclude
it from being an open field, but rather a distinction was to be made
between the curtilage and land outside the curtilage;120 and finally,
(3) the court noted that persons in the field or houses built upon it
would be protected, but not the field itself."1 The court dismissed
2
the "No Trespassing" signs and the gates as irrelevant.
Factually, State v. Thornton 23 was remarkably similar. Acting
upon an unsubstantiated tip that marijuana was growing in a
wooded area behind a mobile home, and without the benefit of a
warrant, officers entered the property of Thornton to verify the existence of the contraband.124 The property was posted against trespassing and hunting and surrounded by an old stone wall and
barbed wire fence. The officers crossed the yard and entered an
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. The court noted that open fields have long been recognized as different from
houses. Id. at 359.
120. The court stated:
Finally, it was suggested at argument that, since these marijuana fields were not
observable while standing on land other than Oliver's, these fields were not 'open
fields' within the meaning of Hester. . . . It is clear, however, that the rule in
these cases is meant to distinguish between curtilage and land outside the
curtilage.
Id. at 360.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. 453 A.2d 489 (Me. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
124. Thornton, 453 A.2d at 490-91.
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overgrown and unpaved road, which they followed into a dense
woods, ultimately discovering marijuana patches.'2 5
The trial court found that a subsequent warrant was tainted by
the illegal search and suppressed both the plants and the testimony as to the observations of the officers. 2 6 The state appealed
and the Maine Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that: (1) the
open fields doctrine required first, that the activity be openly pursued, and second, that the presence of the officers during their observations be lawful; 1 27 (2) the acts of fencing and posting of property clearly indicated that the public was excluded and that
privacy was expected; 2 " (3) the court believed that Katz had modified the wooden application of the open fields doctrine which was
based upon common law property concepts;' 29 and (4) the officers
were not lawfully present on defendant's property when they made
their observations, and because none of the exceptions to the warrant requirement were operating, the fourth amendment forbade
their warrantless intrusion. 3 °
These two cases, with their factual similarity and dissimilarity of
result, are striking examples of the dichotomy which existed in
fourth amendment open fields decisions. They reflected the need
for clarification by the Supreme Court in order to obtain uniformity of constitutional interpretation.
VIII.

OPEN FIELDS

Go

TO WASHINGTON

3

In Oliver1' the Supreme Court announced that its purpose was
to clear the confusion over the vitality of the open fields doctrine. 1 32 The Court stated that the change in language from
Madison's proposed draft' 33 broadened the scope of the fourth
125. Id.
126. Id. at 492.
127. Id. at 495.
128. Id. at 494. "In the present case, the defendant's conduct evidenced a clear expectation of privacy. He chose a spot for the marijuana patches that was observable only from his
land; he posted No Trespassing and No Hunting signs on his land; he generally excluded the
public from his land." Id.
129. Id. at 495. " '[Tlhe issue of whether government action does or does not constitute
a search is now understood to depend less upon the designation of an area than upon a
determination of whether the examination is a violation of privacy on which the individual
justifiably relied as secure from invasion.'" Id. at 493 (quoting State v. Gallant, 308 A.2d
274, 278 (Me. 1973)).
130. Thornton, 453 A.2d at 495-96.
131. Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
132. Id. at 1738.
133. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
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amendment, but that "the term 'effects' is less inclusive than
'property' and cannot be said to encompass open fields."1'34 The
Court asserted that this judgment was not contrary to the Katz
analysis of fourth amendment protection, which was predicated
upon a reasonable expectation of privacy." 5
Announcing that three factors will determine whether a governmental intrusion onto open fields without a warrant and absent exigent circumstances will be adjudged reasonable or unreasonable
and promising that each would be equally weighted, the Court
listed: (1) the intention of the Framers; (2) the uses to which the
individual has put the location; and (3) the understanding of society that certain areas are to be more protected than others. 3' 6 The
Court summarily concluded that these factors precluded any legitimate demand for privacy out of doors beyond the curtilage, without any discussion of how the aforementioned factors applied to
the case at bar.
The Court stated that the types of activities which the amendment was designed to protect from governmental intrusion do not
take place outside the curtilage and declared that society has no
interest in protecting the privacy of those in open fields. 137 Further, the Court contended, fences and signs are ineffective in excluding the public from rural open fields. 138 Interestingly, the
Court found support for this statement in the fact that the government could have surveyed the property from the air but in so doing ignored the obvious fact that Katz, too, was ineffective in excluding the uninvited ear from his phone booth.' 39
134. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1740 (footnote omitted).
135. Id. Stating unequivocally that Justice Harlan's concurrence has become the standard for fourth amendment considerations, the Court opined that "the touchstone of
[Fourth] Amendment analysis has been the question whether a person has a 'constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.'" Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
136. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1741 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1977); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 265 (1960)).
"In this light, the rule of Hester, . . . that we reaffirm today, may be understood as providing that an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of
doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the home." Oliver, 104 S.Ct. at
1741.
137. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1741.
138. Id.
139. The accused in both Oliver and Thornton conceded that overflight of their lands
would not have been a violation. Id. at 1741 n.9 (citing United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d
1373, 1380-81 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078, 1081 (W.D.
Mich. 1980)).
The Court stated that despite its decision here, an individual retains some degree of
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Continuing, the Court reaffirmed Hester's concept of curtilage as
an area which is included within the amendment's explicit protection of the home, distinct from any other outdoor area. The Court
concluded, however, that society is not prepared to accept as reasonable any expectation of privacy in open fields. 4 0
The Court foreclosed any possibility that different circumstances
might make the search of an open field unreasonable. The majority
noted that the case by case analysis which had been taking place
put the authorities at a disadvantage by turning the determination
of a lawful entry by police into guesswork and then subjecting the
judgment of the police to subsequent judicial review. This, the
Court contended, led to the undermining of law enforcement. Additionally, the Court said that such ad hoc determinations encouraged arbitrary and inequitable decisions regarding constitutional rights. 4 '

Then, surprisingly, the Court admitted that fences, warning
signs, and secluded locations could evidence a reasonable expectation of privacy. However, the Court unequivocably stated that
open fields would not be afforded protection regardless of the steps
taken by a citizen to conceal his activities upon them, because police officers would be required to make a value judgment as to the
adequacy of the steps taken. 4 2 The Court reasoned that the
"Framers did not intend that the Fourth Amendment should shelter criminal activity wherever persons with criminal intent choose
to erect barriers and post no trespassing signs."'4 3
The Court went on to note that a trespass would not determine
the constitutionality of a search because "[tihe existence of a propfourth amendment protection in open fields, reasoning that "protections against unreasonable arrest or unreasonable seizure of effects upon the person remain fully applicable." Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1741 n.10.
140. Once again the Court urged the view that this return to the idea that certain areas
were not to be afforded fourth amendment protection was not contrary to the holding in
Katz. "[C]ommon law distinguished 'open fields' from the 'curtilage'.... The distinction
implies that only the curtilage, not the neighboring open fields, warrants the Fourth Amendment protections that attach to the home." Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1742 (citation omitted). It
was because of the close association between the home and its curtilage that protection was
extended to the curtilage in the first place. This extension of protection was accomplished
by "reference to the factors that determine[d] whether an individual reasonably [might]
expect that an area immediately adjacent to the home [would] remain private." Id.
141. Id. at 1742-43.
142. Id. at 1743. Apparently the Court felt that adequate guidelines could not be set to
allow officers to make a value judgment. The Court ignored the fact that officers make value
judgments in every instance where an exception to the warrant requirement exists. The majority was obviously unpersuaded by the cogent solution suggested by the dissenters.
143. Id. at 1743 n.13.
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erty right is but one element in determining whether expectations
14
of privacy are legitimate.
In an attempt to harmonize its use of the common law property
concept of curtilage with its rejection of common law trespass as
definitive of wrongful invasion, the Court simply stated that "[t]he
law of trespass . . .forbids intrusions upon land that the Fourth
Amendment would not proscribe. For trespass law extends to instances where the exercise of the right to exclude vindicates no legitimate privacy interest."1'45 Trespass law is unconnected with the
idea of privacy, the Court contended; the concept of trespass developed in criminal law to protect against theft and vandalism and
in civil law to protect ownership and use of land. 4"
Ultimately, the Court affirmed the decision of the Sixth Circuit
in Oliver and reversed the decision of the Maine Supreme Court in
47
Thornton.
IX.

THE DISSENT NOTES SOME DIFFICULTIES WITH THE DECISION

The dissenting Justices in Oliver recognized the contradiction
which the majority ignored in advocating a literal interpretation of
the fourth amendment while purporting to approve the decision in
Katz. 4 8 Clearly, there is great difficulty in jumping from a liberal
interpretation of the fourth amendment to a literal approach without overruling previous cases. In trying to harmonize such divergent philosophies the Court left us with discordance.
In addition, the dissenters contended, society does respect the
fencing and posting of property as reasonable exhibitions of an expectation to be free from intrusion.14e They noted that such demonstrations of privacy are not invariably connected with a desire to
conduct criminal activity in secrecy but often are connected to per144. Id. at 1743.
145. Id. at 1744.
146. Id. at 1744 n.15.
147. Id. at 1744.
148. Id. at 1744-51 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
149. The dissent noted that
because "property rights reflect society's explicit recognition of a person's authority to act as he wishes in certain areas, [they] should be considered in determining
whether an individual's expectations of privacy are reasonable." . . . Indeed, the
Court has suggested that, insofar as "[olne of the main rights attaching to property is the right to exclude others . . . one who owns or lawfully possesses or
controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by
virtue of this right to exclude."
Id. at 1747 (citations omitted) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12, 153 (1978)).
Positive law, asserted the dissent, supports the reasonableness of the expectation.
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fectly legitimate reasons. 150 Further, they stated that open areas
are presumptively public places unless owners take the initiative to
notify the public of the owner's contrary intentions. 151
Justice Marshall argued that if a member of the public ignored
such notice, he would be liable for criminal sanctions and questioned why a government official should be allowed to ignore that
which the general public is commanded to obey. 52
The ad hoc difficulties envisioned by the majority were not inevitable, the dissent believed. 53 The dissenters submitted that a
workable test could be formulated such that when a landowner's
exclusionary precautions are sufficient to impose criminal sanctions
against trespassers, the fourth amendment's protections should attach. Police officers, being sufficiently conversant with the criminal
law of trespass, are capable of making well-reasoned judgments
about the lawfulness of a search rather than the haphazard guesses
which the majority envisioned.' 5
X.

AGED, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT REMAINS, A SHADOW OF ITS
PREVIOUS SELF

The recent history of open fields decisions has shown that the
Court was somewhat justified in its concern with the conflicting
decisions characteristic of recent open field cases. Thornton and
Oliver represent only the tip of that iceberg. However, the dissent150. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1748 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (meeting lovers, solitary walks,
gathering with fellow worshippers).
151. Some spaces are presumed to be accessible by "positive law and social convention"
absent a manifestation of an intention to exclude. Id. at 1749. The taking of normal precautions to assure privacy in an area would affect the determination of whether fourth amendment protection will attach to that space, the dissent asserted. Additionally, because a landowner is not required to exercise his right to exclude, privacy claims are "strengthened by
the fact that the claimant somehow manifested to other people his desire that they keep
their distance." Id.
152. Id. at 1750.
153. Id.
154. Justice Marshall suggested an easily applied rule: "Private land marked in a fashion
sufficient to render entry thereon a criminal trespass under the law of the state in which the
land lies is protected by the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and
seizures." Id. He stated that the advantages of the rule included: (1) the doctrinal basis is
familiar to officials and citizens alike; (2) substantial case law and statutes would outline the
required precautions; and (3) value judgments by police would be simplified because they
would be based on well-known laws which they are already entrusted to uphold. Id.
As noted earlier, one standard which remains desirable is uniformity of constitutional
rights throughout the land. The dissent fails to address the fact that their alternative solution, resting upon police familarity with local trespass law, will result in differing application
of constitutional protections from one locality to another.

19841

OPEN FIELDS

ing Justices presented a solution, using local trespass law, which
would have left intact the fourth amendment's protection of reasonable expectations of privacy, while providing a rational solution
to this dilemma. 155 If the Court felt it necessary, however, it could
have simply stated that fourth amendment protection does not extend to open fields, regardless of any act by a citizen to assure privacy there, and merely returned open fields to their pre-Katz status. 156 Unsatisfied with this, however, the Court went further, and
in attempting to justify its decision advocated two totally incongruous approaches to solving fourth amendment questions.
The Court's acknowledgement that fences and posting can
demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy and its implicit
recognition that the police are well aware of this clashes with its
rejection of the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis in open
fields cases, leaving one to question whether Katz is still viable,
despite the Court's protestations to the contrary.1 57 One can only
speculate as to when the Court will again acknowledge the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy which is universally
recognized and accepted, then only to summarily dismiss it as being of no import to fourth amendment analysis.
More disturbing, however, is the rationale used to justify this
warrantless intrusion-the contention that the authorities could
158
have lawfully used aerial surveillance to search the property.
Such reasoning is contrary to everything that the Katz Court accomplished. One cannot help but recall the concern of Justice
59
Brandeis in his Olmstead dissent.1
Is the Court prepared to justify an illegal search and seizure
within one's home as soon as a device capable of visually penetrat155. Id.
156. The comment of Justice Holmes in Olmstead comes immediately to mind:
Therefore we must consider the two objects of desire, both of which we cannot
have, and make up our minds which to choose. It is desirable that criminals
should be detected, and to that end that all available evidence should be used. It
also is desirable that the Government should not itself foster and pay for other
crimes, when they are the means by which the evidence is to be obtained.
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
The Oliver Court decided, much as the Olmstead Court had, that it was better to successfully prosecute those involved in drug trafficking and sacrifice individual rights, than live
with the alternative.
157. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1740.
158. Id. at 1741.
159. Brandeis envisioned all kinds of invasions defeating the trespass doctrine which
might be accomplished with the advent of technology as yet unknown in 1928. See supra
note 49 and accompanying text.
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ing walls is invented? Is the Court going to use such convoluted
reasoning to advocate any heretofore unlawful warrantless intrusion merely because a warrant could have been procured which
would have made the intrusion lawful? If the police have at their
disposal a legal method, the use of which would allow a search and
seizure, will they no longer be required to use that legally prescribed method, but because of its very existence are they now to
be permitted to use any method they desire without regard to its
legality? Are we no longer to be afforded the unbiased reasoning of
the courts before zealous police are allowed to enter wherever and
whenever they please? In 1927 Justice Brandeis noted similar concerns.16 0 And although his fears have not yet been realized, they
remain concerns which the Court must not ignore.
The Oliver Court held that requiring the police to use the legal
methods at their disposal would not "advance legitimate privacy
interests." ' One can only conclude that Justices White, Marshall,
Brennan, and Stevens may have shown remarkable wisdom in refusing to have their names and reputations connected to such a
broad rejection of fourth amendment application to open fields
searches and seizures.
The Court has concluded that the fourth amendment may no
longer be applied to open fields. In so doing, the Court returns to a
literal interpretation of the Constitution. The Court's journey into
liberal interpretation was short lived-a mere seventeen years.
This change in philosophy is understandable, for it has occurred
before and will no doubt occur again. But the difficulties in the
Court's rationale present a distinctive concern. Did the Court intend to restrict the fourth amendment's application only in the
area of open fields or does the decision foreshadow further intrusions into what have come to be expected fourth amendment protections? Only time will provide the answers to these questions.

160.
161.

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 432, 474 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1741 n.9.

